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Abstract 
An econometric model, based on the Romer-Rosenthal model of 
agenda control by budget-maximizing bureaucracies is used to analyze 
the budgetary and voting outcomes of referenda in a cross-section 
of Oregon school districts. In addition to estimates of the effects 
of agenda control, the model permits estimation of the spending effects 
of voter failure to perceive the .availability of lump-sum 
intergovernmental grants. Budgets are set via referenda. In the 
event of a failed referendum, a limited number of additional votes 
may be taken. The model permits estimation of the degree to which 
the agenda setter (e.g., the school superintendent) learns about 
voter preferences from the outcomes of failed referenda. 
The endogenous variables in the model are the budget proposals 
and voting outcomes of each referendum in the sequence of referenda 
held in each school district. The effects of proposals on voting 
behavior and the effects of learning appear via structural parameters 
in the error structure. The model is estimated by non-linear 
maximum likelihood. The results (1) support the theoretical model 
of agenda control and the effect of the setter's proposals on voting 
behavior; (2) indicate that voter failure to preceive state grants 
leads to important increases in spending; (3) fail to indicate any 
learning by the setter. 
IF AT FIRST YOU DON 'T SUCCEED: 
BUDGETING BY A SEQUENCE OF REFERENDA
K. Ladha, T. Romer, and H. Rosenthal 
I. Introduction 
Over a decade ago, Bradford and Oates (197 1a, b) argued that the 
impact of intergovernmental grants must be analyzed in the context of the 
institutional structure of local governments. For the most part, however, 
econometric work in the area has either ignored local political 
processes, 1 or assumed that these can conveniently be collapsed into a
"median voter" framework. 
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The most striking feature of the estimates of 
the effect of grants-in-aid is their wide variation across studies and 
samples. Lump-sum, non-matching grants, for example, have been estimated 
to increase local expenditures by much less than the amount of the grant,
3 
or to have highly stimulative effects -- with spending increasing by close 
to the full amount of the grant. 11 (This latter finding, often dubbed the 
"flypaper effect", has been particularly troubling, in light of the 
significantly smaller effects predicted by neoclassical models of public 
spending.) 
The institutional structure of local political processes varies 
widely fr an state to state, and may even vary across localities within a 
state. Modeling this variation in institutional structures may account 
for the wide range of estimates, as well as for the magnitude of some of 
the estimates. In this paper, we pursue a number of issues raised in 
earlier work on modeling the interaction of political and economic 
processes involved in local public spending decisions. The 
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impact of outside grants in our model is intimately linked to the way 
these processes work. 
Recent theoretical work has focused on the way the rules governing 
the formulation of proposals in expenditure referenda affect the results 
of such elections. This research places particular emphasis on the 
importance of ag enda control by those in charge of public goods 
provision.5 In the context of expenditure referenda, agenda control means
restricted access to the power to make proposals that will be placed on 
the ballot. Ackn owledging the existence of such power is in contrast to 
those models in which access to the agenda is unlimited. 6 In agenda
control models, the preferences and actions of the group that makes 
proposals-the agenda setter-together with the institutional "rules of 
the game" become fundamentally important determinants of the outcomes. 
The Agenda Control Model 
Romer and Rosenthal ( 1979a) provided a theoretical model that deals 
explicitly with agenda control and its effects on the determination of 
collective expenditures by referendum. They consider a process in which 
the setter is the supplier of a collectively financed good. The setter is 
assumed to have preferences strictly increasing in the level of spending. 
Budgets (and, effectively, tax rates) are determined by simple majority 
vote in referenda that confront voters with a "forced choice" between the 
setter's proposal and an exogenous, prespecified reversion expenditure 
level. If the setter' s proposal fails, the reversion is enacted. The 
reversion plays a crucial role in the process, since a sufficiently low 
reversion can be used as part of a threat strategy by the setter in order 
to extract higher spending from voters. The model identifies a 
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relationship between reversions and proposals as an important potential 
test for the presence of agenda control by budget-maximizing setters. 
In some contexts, the setter may be allowed more than one attempt to 
pass a budget. Typically, there is a legislated limit on the number of 
elections that can be used to determine a given period's budget. The 
sequence of referenda terminates whenever a budget is approved or the 
limit is reached or the setter chooses to stop making proposals--which ever 
comes first. How the setter formulates his proposals over a sequence of 
referenda depends not only on the reversion but also on such factors as 
the setter' s uncertainty about citizen preferences and voter turnout, the 
length of the sequence, and the possibilities the setter has for learning 
about the electorate from one referendum to the next. In Romer and 
Rosenthal ( 1979a), the sequence and the uncertainty facing the setter are 
modeled in a fairly simple way. Voters do not behave strategically. In 
deciding how to vote, a citizen does not take into consideration the 
possibility th at th e setter may try again if his proposal loses. 
Uncertainty is present due to random turnout. Citizens are assumed to 
vote with an exogenous and kn own (to the setter) probability that is 
independent of the proposal on the ballot and is constant over the 
sequence. The reversion is also fixed during the sequence of elections 
used to determine a given period' s spending. Under these conditions, a 
(risk neutral) setter wishing to maximize the expected budget would plan a 
sequence made up of proposals that decline from one referendum to the next. 
The Empirical Context 
Th e empirical investigation of propositions emerging from th is 
framework has focused on public sch ool budget referenda in Oregon school 
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districts. The institutional structure of these elections conforms quite 
closely to the process analyz ed by Romer and Rosenthal. Local school 
budgets are determined by a referendum process in which the proposals 
emerge from the school bureaucracy. Reversions are defined by the state 
constitution and are, from the point of view of a given year' s budget, 
predetermined. In many districts, the reversion is too low to operate the
schools without additional funds. Spending in excess of a district's 
reversion must be approved by the voters. There are provisions for 
h olding more than one referendum in a year, but at most eight elections 
(depending on state law in a given year) may be called.7 In some 
districts, failure to pass a referendum has resulted in the schools' being 
closed for several months. As the setter model would predict, this 
outcome is very infrequent. That it occurs at all, however, demonstrates 
th at the setter's threat is a very real one. 
Spending: The Impact of Reversions and Information 
The initial emphasis of the em pirical work was on the impact of 
reversions on expenditures. 8 Romer and Rosenthal (19 82b) and Filimon � 
fu (1982) showed that taking reversion effects into account yields a
significant improvem ent over the standard "median-voter" specification of
a log-linear spending equation: agenda control does matter. The setter' s 
ability to use the reversion as a threat was found to be particularly 
strong when the reversion is at or below the "threshold level", defined as 
the spending necessary to keep schools open. 
While pointing to the importance of reversions, these estimates also 
indicated that it is not tenable to assume that either the setter or th e 
voters act as if th ey have full information. On the setter's side, the 
s 
results were inconsistent with the predictions of the certainty model and 
suggested that setter errors due to turnout fluctuations or imperfect 
knowledge of voters' preferences may be important. At the same time, 
voters appear to be quite ignorant of resources available to the district 
from outside grants (i.e., state aid), and setters are able to exploit 
this ignorance. The lack of voter awareness of outside grants aids the 
setter directly (increased spending due to the grant) and through the 
reversion effect. (The voters perceive the reversion, which includes 
state aid, to be lower than it actually is.>9 
Voting 
But expenditures are only one side of the story. In studying the 
interaction of economic and political forces, it seems natural to consider 
both political as wel1 as economic outcomes. Specifically, in a budget 
referendum, these correspond, respectively, to the result of the election 
(measured, for example, by the fraction of those voting who approved of 
the proposal) and the expenditure proposed to the voters. Of course, 
these are jointly determined. A two-equation model of voting and spending 
was introduced in Romer and Rosenthal ( 19 82a). Since the present paper 
builds on this two-equation framework, it is useful to review it briefly. 
If a budget-maximizing setter had full information about voter 
turnout and preferences, he would choose an expenditure proposal that made 
the decisive voter just indifferent between voting for the proposal and 
choosing the reversion. The proposal would correspond to the largest 
expenditure acceptable to at least half the voters. This .would imply that 
referenda would just barely pass--the Yes vote would be very close to SOS. 
When the setter faces uncertainty, however, the expected voting outcome 
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could be different than this. A risk-neutral setter expecting random 
turnout may make a proposal whose expected Yes vote is not SOS; that is, 
the setter may "aim" for a different result. (In fact, when the setter 
can potentially make a sequence of proposals, he may initially even make 
proposals that he expects to lose. We return to this later.) If the 
setter makes errors in formulating his expenditure proposal, then there 
may be additional deviations from a SOS yes vote. 
The possibility that the setter makes errors creates a link between a 
spending proposal and the corresponding vote result. Suppose that, based 
on his information about voter turnout and preferences, the setter makes a 
proposal that he expects to yield �S yes vote. Because his information is
imperfect, however, suppose that his proposal is "too high". This 
positive error in setting his proposal will result in a lower than 
expected yes vote. Similarly, a negative error in setting the proposal 
will tend to raise the yes vote above �S. The two-equation model captures
this dependence by including the setter's expenditure proposal error as a 
variable in the voting equation. Although the coefficient on this 
variable could not be directly estimated, the prediction that its sign is 
negative could be tested by estimating the covariance of the residuals 
from the two equations. This estimate was in fact consistent with the 
predicted sign, lending further support to the agenda control model. 
Planning and Learning in a Sequence of Elections 
Neither the single-equation expenditure models nor the two-equation 
model deal with considerations that arise when there is the possibility of 
holding more than one election to determine a given year' s budget. (The 
expenditure equation models use data from the winning election, while the 
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two-equation model uses data from the year's first 
availability of the sequence is empirically important. 
election. )  Th e 
In our sample of 
111 Oregon school districts that h eld budget elections in 1 971 (for the 
1971-72 school year), only 69 passed proposals on the first try. Of the 
remaining 42 districts, 25 passed on the second try and 13 on the third, 
while four districts passed proposals only on the fourth attempt. 
We h ave already pointed to one element of the setters' strategy in a 
sequence: plan on a series of proposals, each somewhat smaller than the 
one before it. In this way, the risk of losing is traded off against the 
opportunity to gain from a favorable turnout from high-demand voters. In
the framework that led to this result, the setter' s uncertainty was due
entirely to random turnout fluctuations. The results of a losing election
in a sequence provided no new information to be used in determining the 
next proposal. There is no link, therefore between the vote outcome in 
one election and the proposal in the next election. 
Suppose, however, that the setter had some uncertainty about voter 
preferences, as well as turnout. Then the observation of the vote on a 
first election loss may provide the setter wi th some information about his 
"expenditure error". (As in the two-equation model, there would be a 
negative relationship between this error and the voter outcome.) He may 
then use this information to adjust his proposal for the second equation, 
relative to what it would have been otherwise. This updating would create
a link between the vote in the first election and the spending proposal in 
the second election. Th e updating would continue after each failed 
proposal. 
In the next section of th is paper we develop an econometric 
specification of a setter model of referenda with a sequence of 
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elections. The model has six equations--an expenditure equation and a 
vote equation for each of the first three elections-that are linked 
th rough th e model's error structure. The expenditure equations 
incorporate the reversion effects as well as imperfect information by 
setter and voters. The voting equations include parameters that reflect 
the setter' s errors in making proposals. We stopped at the third election 
because there are too few four election observations (4 ) for estimation of 
a four election model. Section 3 presents the results of our estimates of 
this model. 
2. Spending and V oting in a Sequence 
The Spending Equation 
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The core of our model is the expenditure equation developed in 
Filimon et al. ( 1982). This equation incorporates an estimate of voter 
preferences, the effect of reversions, and the possibility of voter 
ignorance of state aid. We modify this specification to capture errors 
made by the setter and to take into account the sequence of proposals. 
The basis of the setter's proposals is the distribution of the 
largest expenditure acceptable to voters in his district, given the 
district's reversion, together with an estimate of turnout probabilities. 
If there were only one election, this information would generate an 
expenditure proposal that we assume is adequately approximated by: 
ln E
P 
= ln Ed + e1H + e2 ln z + u + e' ( 1 ) 
In this specification, the variables with over bars represent perceived, 
rather than actual quantities, to reflect the voter' s possible lack of 
information about outside grants. Thus, 
proposal, measured in dollars per student. 
! is the p perceived budget
Ed is the underlying demand
for perceived expenditures (per student) of a "representative" voter, in 
the absence of reversion considerations. The variables H and Z depend on
the reversion as perceived by this voter. The error terms u and e' 
reflect errors by the setter and by the modeler, respectively. 
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D emand 
We characterize the "representative" demand for perceived 
expenditures by using a log-linear specification that is standard in the 
literature: 
ln Ed 
= Bo + s, 1n y + B2ln p + B3ln s + e" (2) 
where 
y is perceived household income
p is tax price faced by the household
s is number of students in household
e" is an error term 
Agenda Control Effects 
The reversion variables are defined as follows : 
. ·{; 
if Q�µ 
if Q > µ
z 
·
{
:
if Q�µ 
if 0 > µ 
O' is the perceived reversion per student. The parameter µ, which is to be 
estimated, is a nonnegative constant corresponding to the "threat 
threshold". If the reversion is below this threshold, the reversion is 
insufficient to operate the schools. Consequently, for reversions at or 
below µ, the setter's threat position vis-a-vis the voters is stronger 
than for higher reversions. Moreover, this threat is equally strong for 
any reversion perceived by the voters to be below the threshold. Equation 
11 
( 1 )  characterizes this relationship by positing that, ceteris paribus, 
proposed spending is constant for Q < µ. When the perceived reversion is
above the threshold, proposed spending is taken to be a loglinear function 
of the reversion. The threshold effect implies e1 > O. With uncertain
voter turnout, Romer and Rosenthal (1979a) suggest that the sign of e2 is
ambiguous . 
Voter Perception and State Aid 
Actual and perceived quantities may differ because of misperception 
by voters of state aid available to the local school district. 10 This aid 
was in the form of 11.unp-sum per-student grants . If A is the amount of the 
grant per student, we let (1-p )A be the amount perceived per student, 
where p is a parameter to be estimated and is assumed equal across school
districts. The perceived quantities are then defined as: 
E
p = EL + (1 -p )A
'! = Y + (1-p )rA
Q = Q1 + (1-p )A 
(3) 
(4) 
(5 ) 
EL is the proposed expenditure to be financed out of local taxes. Y is
the "representative" household 1 s income and r is this household's tax 
share. Q1 is the local portion of the reversion. In Oregon, it is
composed of a lump-sum intermediate district payment an.cl an amount 
specified by the state cons ti tut ion. If the local expenditure proposal 
passes, total spending per student is: 
E = Ea. + A
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State aid affects local spending through three channels: 
Individual incomes: Perceived state aid affects perceived income, 
through (4), and hence demand for local spending. This is the income 
effect typically captured in standard models of public spending (with P=O ).  
"Flypaper": State aid can be added on to spending from local 
sources. If the aid is not fully perceived by voters, perceived total 
spending can differ fran actual; if p>O, then t'. < E. p This is a
"flyp aper" type of effect: the greater p, the stickier the "flyp aper". 
- Reversion and threshold: State aid forms part of the district's 
reversion. Even if state aid is correctly perceived by voters (p :O ), this 
reversion effect would cause the impact of aid on spending to differ from 
the impact of the income effect alone. [Romer and Rosenthal ( 1980 ). J For
relatively low reversions, the setter benefits fran imperfect perception 
of state aid. If p)O,  the perceived reversion is less than the actual 
reversion, increasing the setter's threat position vis-a-vis the voters 
(relative to P=O ). This effect -is enhanced for districts whose actual
reversion CQ1+A) is above the shut-down threshold µ, but whose perceived 
reversion Q is below the threshold.
On the whole, the "flyp aper" and "reversion" effects are likely to 
outweigh the income effect, so that the setter will typically benefit from 
higher values of p. [See Filimon et al. ( 1982). J 
Expenditures with a Single Election 
Substituting (2 ) into ( 1 )  gives the specification for a 
single-election expenditure equation: 
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ln E'P = s0 + s11n Y + s21n P + a31n s + e1H + e2ln z + u + e 
The errors e' and e" are errors in specifying the reversion effect and the 
underlying demand, respectively. 'We assume that across observations they 
each have i .i .d. normal distributions with zero mean. They cannot be 
separately identified, so we write them as e = e' + e". The setter's 
� u is due to the setter's lack of information about turnout and voter 
preferences. Since the setter does not make the errors captured by e, we 
will call e the econometrician's error (even though this is a mild 
misnomer, in that the econometrician also makes the error u). 
Spending Proposals in a Sequence 
To place the process in the context of a sequence, we redefine 
variables slightly, to distinguish between various elections. 'We let E' 1 
be the perceived proposal on the first, E2 the perceived proposal on the 
second, and E3 the perceived proposal on the third election. Then 
ln E1 = s01 + XS + e1H + a2ln z + u1 + e1 (6) 
ln E'2 = s02 + Xe + e1R + a21n Z + u1 + e1 
+ (learning update) + e2 (7) 
ln E'3 = s03 + Xs + a1H + a21n Z + u1 + e1 + e2 
+ (second learning update) + e3 (8) 
The expression XS is shorthand for the RHS of (2), minus the intercept and 
the error term e" • 
Equation (7) and (8) differ from (6) only through the error structure 
and the constant term. To motivate the latter difference, we first note 
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that , by law, the reversion in a district is the same for each election in 
a sequence. Furthermore, we assume that voters are randomly drawn from 
the same population in each election and that voters do not behave 
strategically. Then the model presented in Romer and Rosenthal ( 1979a) 
leads, in the absence. of learning by the setter, to the hypothesis of a 
sequence of declining proposals. Given our relatively small sample of 
districts with multiple elections, we allowed only the constant to change 
across elections, and predicted B01 > s02 > B0 3• 
As to the error structure, the econometrician makes additional errors 
e2 and e3 in the second and third elections. These errors pertain to
specification of the learning update. The setter's error in (7) and (8)
consists of his error on the first proposal, u1, modified by whatever 
adjustment he makes by learning. If the outcome of the first election 
yields information that the setter uses to update what would otherwise 
have been his second proposal, then the second expenditure equation should 
incorporate this updating. Similar considerations apply on the third 
attempt. In order to discuss the specification of setter learning, we 
must deal with the voting equations. 
The Voting Equations 
The voting variable we will be concerned with is the vote logit V, 
defined as 
V = ln [Number of Yes Votesl Number of No Votes J 
A fundamental simplifying assumption concerning voter turnout (i.e., the 
fraction of the electorate that votes) is that it is unrelated to the 
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reversion or the setter's proposal. A risk-neutral setter maximizing the 
expected budget under perfect knowledge of voter preferences and turnout 
probabilities would generally choose a sequence of proposals such that the 
corresponding expected vote logit would differ from zero (i.e., the 
expected yes vote is other than 50'.l). Let the expected vote logit for 
such a setter on the tth election be at (t=1,2,3). The analysis of 
sequences in Romer and Rosenthal ( 1979a) suggests that a3 > a2 > a1. Of 
course, actual logit values would differ according to turnout fluctuations . 
If the setter makes errors due to his misperceptions of voter 
preferences or turnout probabilities, the vote outcome should reflect this 
error. As we discussed in the Introduction, there should be a negative 
relationship between the setter's error in his proposal and the vote 
logit. A proposal that is too large (relative to a zero-error proposal) 
will lead to an expected logit less than at, while a proposal that is too 
small will drive the expected logit above at. 
In combining these effects, we have the voting equations 
Vt = at + 6Ut + Vt' t=1,2,3 (9)
 
The sub scripts refer to election numbers. The errors vt reflect
specification errors or other factors independent of the expenditure 
equations. (We will assume that v1, v2, and v3 are uncorrelated and have 
identical normal distribution with zero mean.) The parameter 6, whose 
sign is predicted to be negative, is 
,
a straightforward (and admittedly 
crude) characterization of the way setter errors are translated into vote 
outcomes. We assume that this relationship is the same in all elections. 
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Less defensibly, we also assume that the parameters at and 5 are constant 
across school districts.11 
Learning: A Heuristic Representation 
Using equation (9), we can develop a heuristic approximation to 
represent learning by the setter. A given proposal Et, with no setter 
error, is expected to lead to a logit of at. How the setter responds to a 
particular vote outcome Vt will depend on his assessment of the relative 
importance of the error term vt. We assume that the setter knows both 5 
and the variance of every error. Since v t has zero mean, if its varian
ce 
is also known to be very close to zero, then the deviation Vt-at must be 
due nearly entirely to the setter's error. In this case, it seems 
reasonable for the setter to adjust his next proposal by -(Vt-at) I 6, 
relative to what would otherwise have been his optimal proposal on that 
election. (In other words, if v1 < a1, this means cutting back the second 
proposal�recall that 6 < 0.) 
When the variance of vt is large, relative to the variance of the 
setter's error, then the deviation Vt-at does not provide very much 
information. In this case, the adjustment of the next proposal should be 
at best a fraction of -(Vt-at)/6. For example, if the variance of v1 is
positive while that of u1 is very close to zero, then nearly the entire 
deviation v1-a1 must be due to factors other than sette r's error.
Consequently, little or no adjustment of the second proposal is called for 
on the basis of information obtained fran the first election outcome. 
A simple way to incorporate this kind of updating into the second and 
third expenditure equations is to include a term -s(Vt-at)/5, where the 
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parameter s (O�s�1) represents the adjustment factor. We will assume that 
this parameter is the same across all jurisdictions. 
Including this "learning update" tenn in (7) and (8), we can rewrite 
the second and third expenditure equations as: 
ln �2 
= e02 + X8 + e1
R + e21n Z - s(V1-a1)/o + u1 + e1 + e2 (10) 
ln E3 = e03 + xe + e1R + e21n Z - scv2-a2)/o + u2 + e1 + e2 + e3 (1 0') 
Since 
(Vt-at)/6 = ut + vt/6, 
the setter's errors in (10) and (101) become 
u2 
= (1-s)u1 - sv1/o 
u3 = (
1-s)u2 - sv2/o 
. 2 
= (1-s) u1 - s(1-s)v1/o - sv2/o 
The whole system can then be rewritten as: 
ln E1 = e01 + Xe + e1H + e2ln z + u1 + e1 
v1 
= a1 + ou1 + v1 
ln E2 
= e02 +Xe + e1H + e2ln Z + (1-s)u1 - sv1/o + e1 + e2 
v2 
= a2 + o(1-s)u1 - sv1 + v2 
- - - 2 ln E3 = e03 + xe + e1H + e21n z + (1-s) u1 
v3 
= a3 + 
- s(1-s)v1/o - sv2/o + 
e1 + e2 + e3 
2 
o(1-s) u1 - s(1-s)v1 - s v2 + v3 
(11a) 
( 12a) 
(11b) 
( 12b) 
(11 c) 
( 12c) 
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The errors u1, et, and v t are assumed to have the following
structure. A given error is assumed to be uncorrelated across school 
districts and have, in each district, the same normal distribution with 
zero mean. The error variances are: 
Var(u1) 
Var(e1) 
2 = au 
2 
: T1 
Var(v1> = Var(v2> 
= Var(v3> 
2 
Var(e2) = T2 Var(e3) 
2 = av 
2 : T3 
Furthermore, the econometrician' s errors et are uncorrelated with each 
other or with any other disturbance term. Because turnout is independent 
of the setter's proposal, the setter's error u1 is uncorrelated with the 
voting equation errors v t. We assume that turnout does not depend on the 
outcome of elections, so that the vt are also uncorrelated. 
In specifying the model, we had to trade off generality against the 
estimation problems posed by the small number of observations with second 
or third elections. We decided to allow proposals to change only through 
the intercepts and the learning update. We did not allow for temporal 
variation in a2. v We have three econanetrician's error variances, -r�. The 
model is not identified unless we assume the econometrician errs in 
modelling the updates as well as in modelling the initial proposal. 
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3. Estimation and Results
The income, tax-price, and students per household variables that 
appear in the expenditure equation were computed as follows. Income, Y, 
is median family income adjusted for school bond and other prior school 
tax commitments. Tax price, P, per dollar of per student spending was 
measured as tax share multiplied by enrollment in the school district. In 
turn, we computed tax share as the ratio of median housing value to total 
assessed valuation. As a measure of the number of students in the voter's 
household, S, we used the ratio of total school enrollment to the number 
of families.12 Data on basic variables appear in Table 1. 
The threshold effect associated with the reversion variables creates 
a discontinuity in equations ( 11) when the perceived reversion equals the
threshold parameter µ. In order to make the likelihood function and its
partial derivatives continuous, we used a technique developed by Tishler 
and Zang (1979). This involves approximating the discontinuous variable H 
and the var iable Z (whose first derivative is discontinuous) by twice
continuously differentiable polynomials whenever the perceived reversion 
falls in an interval within :!:.Y of the threshold; y is a prespecified
positive constant. 
13 In the estimates that we report here, we have set 
y=2.0, less than 11 of the estimated threshold. 
The error structure of the system (11 )-(12) is also used in the. 
estimation. We let a11 be the error variance of the first expenditure
equation, a22 that of the first voting equation, a33 of the second
expenditure equation, and a44 of the second voting equation, etc.
Similarly, a 12 is the covariance between the first expenditure equation
and the first voting equation, etc. The variances and covariances of the 
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error structure in equations ( 11)-( 12) can then be expressed in terms of 
the individual error variances and the structural parameters s and o. 
2 2 a11 = au + i:1 
a22 
a33 
a44 
a
55 
a66
a12 
a13 
a14 
a15 
a16 
a23 
a24 
a25 
a26 
a34 
a35 
a36 
a45 
a46 
a56 
= o2a2 + a
2 
u v 
= (1-sl
2a2 u 
2 2 2 2 2 
+ i:1 + i:2 + (s /o )av 
= .s2C1-s) 2 a2 + (1+s2la2 u v 
2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 = i:1 + i:2 + i:3 + 
(1-s) au + [(1-s) +
1](s /o )av 
= o
2C1-sl4 a2 + [s
2C1-sl2+s
2
+1]a
2 
u v 
= oa
2 
u
2 2 
= i:1 + (1-s)au 
= o(1-sla
2 
u
2 2 2 
= i:1 + (
1-s) au 
= oC1-sl2a2 
u 
2 2 = o(1-s)au - (s/o)av 
= a
2c1-sla
2 - sa
2 
u v 
2 2 2 
= oC1-sl au - (s/olC1-slav 
= a
2
c1-sl
2/ - sC1-sl/ u v 
= o(1-sl
2
a
2 
+ Cs
2/ola
2 
u v 
2 2 3 2 2 2 2 = i:1 + i:2 + (
1-s) au + (s /o ) (1-s1a v
= o(1-s)3a2 + Cs
2/o)(1-sla
2 
u v 
= o(1-sl3a
2 
+ (s/o)[s(1-sl-1la
2 
u v 
= o2C1-sl3a
2 
+ s[s(1-s)-1]a
2 
u v 
4 2 2 2 2 = oC1-s) au + Cs /5)[(1-s) + 1]av 
( 13) 
( 14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
(17) 
( 18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
2 2 2 
These twenty-one equations in the seven parameters s, o, i:1, i:2, i:3, 
a�, and a� yield an overidentified system. In estimating (11)-(12) by
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full information maximum likelihood methods, however, we can incorporate 
the overidentifying restrictions ( 13 )-(33). In this way, the estimated 
parameters will be the set that minimizes the variance-covariance matrix 
of the estimated standard errors of these parameters. The maximum 
likelihood procedure recognizes that some observations have no second or 
third elections. In the Appendix, we provide some details about the 
derivation of the likelihood function. 
Results of the maximum likelihood estimation are presented in Table 
2. To indicate the stability of most parameters, we present estimates for 
the case where just the first election data are used, then the first two 
elections, and finally the first three elections. In all three cases, the 
coefficients on income cs,), tax price (82)· and number of students in the
household Cs3), and their estimated standard errors are very close to the
estimates from the single-equation expenditure model of Filimon et .!!..:. 
(1982). The same is true of the reversion coefficients e 1 and e2, the
threat threshold µ, and the perception parameter p. The impact of 
reversions and of voter misperception of outside grants is undiminished in 
the fuller system. 
Perception and State Aid 
The estimated perception parameter p is 0. 97. While we readily
reject the null hypothesis of complete information (p=0. 0), we fail to 
reject the hypothesis that voters act as if there were no state aid 
(p:1.0). Thus, a dollar of state grant leads to a dollar of additional
expenditure, with no reduction in local taxes. Using P= 1 , the direct 
proportional effect of aid on per student spending is Al(E-A). From Table 
1, for first elections, at the sample means thi s is A/(E-A ) = 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
El:
E2:
E3:
proposed total expenditure per student, 
first election, 1971-72 (dollars), 
all districts 
districts failing first election 
proposed total expenditure per 
student, second election, 1971-72 
districts failing second election 
proposed total expenditure per student, 
third election, 1971-72 
Y: median family income, adjusted
for local school bond taxes and 
intermediate ed ucation district 
taxes and receipts (dollars) 
R: true cash value of all taxable 
real estate in district (dollars) 
K: median housing value (dollars) 
D: 
P: 
A: 
total students, measured by 
average daily membership 
tax price = DK/R (dollars) 
(lump sum) state aid per student from 
the Basic Sc hool Support Fund (dollars) 
Q1: local reversion per student (dollars)
S: Students per family 
v1: vote legit, first election•
v2: vote legit, second election•
v3: vote legit, third election•
Mean 
957. 09 
984. 60 
972. 51 
952. 51 
949. 09 
9341.03 
1 00 
• 337 • 000 
13,411. 20 
2591.52 
0.378 
228.54 
258. 01 
0.973 
0.140 
0. 073 
0. 030 
Standard 
Deviation 
18 0.36 
188. 80 
194. 05 
181. 86 
181. 36 
1320.18 
139,489,000 
3291. 61 
3602.58 
0.151 
5 7. 40 
150. 60 
0. 203 
0. 369 
0.300 
0. 143 
•Antilogit of mean v1 = 53. 49S. Antilogits
44. 29S and 62.46�. 
of ..!. one standard deviation:
Antilogit of mean v2 = 51. 81S. Antilogits
44.33S and 59. 221. 
of + one standard deviation: 
Antilogit of mean v1 = 50. 75S. Antilogits of.!. one standard deviation:
47.20S and 54.3TS. -V [The antilogit of V is given by 1/(l+e ).] 
Number of observations in sample: 111. [42 districts had two elections,
17 districts had three.]
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228.54/(95 7.09 - 228.54 ) = 0.3 1, and for second elections it is 
228.54/(952.51 - 228.54) = 0.32. The presence of state aid increased 
proposed expenditures by roughly 30 percent. 
e1
Proposed expenditures are raised another 100(e -1) = 14.3$ for those 
districts with reversions just below the threshold of $211 relative to 
those districts just above the threshold. Full perception of state aid, 
whose mean of $228.54 exceeds the threshold, would put nearly all 
observations above the threshold. Thus, voters' failure to perceive state 
aid may not only increase proposals by 30$ due to direct perception 
effects, but, in a substantial number of districts, also by another 14.3$ 
due to reversion effects. 
We would also expect these effects to work in reverse, at least at 
the margin. The magnitudes of our estimates suggest that a cutback in 
state aid would not be offset, even partially, by local spending on public 
education. 
Learning and Adjustment 
The expenditure intercept terms a01, a02, and a03 have almost
identical estimates, with large standard errors. This suggests that the 
underlying pattern of a sequence of decreasing proposals of the type 
suggested by Romer and Rosenthal (1979a) is not important. 
The "learning update" parameter s is estimated at 0.222, with a 
standard error equal to this estimate. As might be expected, s is the 
parameter whose estimate is most affected by using the data from all 
three, as against only the first two, elections. The estimate is in the 
theoretically predicted range of [0,1] both times. In both cases, it is 
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small relative to its standard error, but with the additional data the 
estimate equals its standard error whereas it is only one-half the 
standard error in the ti,ro-election case. This suggests that our failure 
to find substantial updating may relate to the small effective sample size 
with multiple elections. 
Even with more data, however, we would be unlikely to discover an 
effect of appreciable importance. Setters do not appear to adjust 
proposals in light of election outcomes in the heuristic manner that we 
postulated.14 Based on the expenditure equation estimates, it seems that 
the first spending proposal is also an excellent prediction of the second 
proposal in those districts where the first election fails. The data 
appear to bear this out. Of the 42 districts in which there was a second 
election, 16 first-election proposals were not changed and three were 
increased (by less than 3$). Of the remaining 23 districts where the 
first proposal was defeated, only 1 O saw cuts by more than 2$ between the 
first election and the second. The average differences in proposals ($949 
vs. $953) between the second and third elections was even less than the 
difference between the first two ($985 vs. $973). 
In contrast to the absence of significant updating, the setter's 
error influences vote outcomes as we expected. The sign of 6 is negative:
a proposal that is "too large" drives the vote logit below the 
"error-free" expected value. To get a feel for the effect of the setter's 
error on voting, we canputed the impact that a $50 per student "error" 
would have in an "average" district. From Table 1, using statewide mean 
values and our estimate of p=0.975, an "average" first election perceived 
expenditure is 957.09 - 0.975 x 228.54 = 734.26. For a $50 error in 
perceived spending per student, u1 is given by:
TABLE 2 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES 
One Election Estimates 
Structural Estimated 
Parameters Estimate Standard Error 
eo1 -2 .015 1.683 
eo2
603 
e1 o. 775 0.180 
S2 -0.362 0.054 
63 -0.242 0.078 
e
l 0.136 0.047 
e2 0.186 0.085 
p o. 972 0.196 
µ. 2 11.80 37.36 
Q'l 0.140 0.040 
Q'2
0'3 
0 
s 
Error Variances* 
2Tl 
2 
T2
2 T3
2 
cru 
2cr v 
Ln of likelihood 
function -731.12 
Two Election Estimates 
Estimated 
Estimate Standard Error 
-1. 947 1. 72 0
-1.961 1. 72 3
0.768 0.185 
-0.364 0.054 
-0.240 0.080 
0.135 0.047 
0.185 0.085 
0.974 0.202 
2 11. 51 38.50 
0.140 0.043 
0.297 0.090 
-7. 2 07 3.431 
0.092 0.193 
0.02 6 0.0055 
0.0012 0.0002 6 
0.002 0 0.002 0 
0.036 0.010 
-929.2 12 
Three Election Estimates 
Estimated 
Estimate Standard Error 
-1.900 1.767 
-1. 905 1. 770
-1. 918 1. 772
0.762 0.189 
-0.367 0.052 
-0.242 0.082 
0.134 0.047 
0.186 0.087 
0.975 0.202 
211.34 38.53 
0.140 0.044 
0.2 2 4  0.098 
0.396 0.174 
-5.378 2.001 
0.22 2  0.2 23 
0.025 �o. 0055 
0.0012 0.0002 8 
0.00065 0.00053 
0.0032 0.002 4 
0.047 0.013 
-1006.638 
*The parameters &, T21, cr
2, and cr2 are not identified in single election estimates. The reduced 
u v 
form estimates (and estimated standard errors) are: cr11, 0.0273(0.0057); cr22 , 0.136(0.018);
0'12 ' -0.012 5(0.0069). 
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u1 = ln(784.26) - ln(734.26) = 0.066
If v1 = 0, the effect of a setter's error of this magnitude on the first
election outcome is: 
V 1 = a1 + 6u 1 = -0. 215, 
which corresponds to a 44.6S Yes vote, as contrasted with the 53.5S Yes 
vote (implied by a1:0.140) that would be expected with u1:o. On the
second election, the effect of the error, adjusted by our point estimate 
of the learning update, can be calculated by setting v 2 also equal to
zero , so that 
v2 = "2 + 6(1-s)u1 = -0.051,
which corresponds to a 48. 7S Yes vote, rather than the 55. 6S Yes vote 
(corresponding to a2 = 0.224) that would be implied by complete updating
( s= 1). 
For the third election, a similar calculation shows 
2 v3 = a3 + 6(1-s) u1 = 0.182,
which corresponds to a 54.6S Yes vote, rather than the 59.SS vote 
(corresponding to a3 = O. 396) implied by complete updating. Comparing the 
estimates of the voting equation intercepts, "t, suggests that the
expected vote logit on each later election is greater than that on the 
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preceding election. This would be consistent with the kind of sequence 
derived in Romer and Rosenthal (1979a). Yet, as we have seen, the 
expenditure equation estimates do not reveal a strong sequence effect. 
Given the data at our disposal, we cannot be definite about the net effect 
of the underlying sequence structure. 
Some reconciliation of the results may be suggested by comparing the 
effect of the setter's error in the voting and the expenditure equations. 
In the second election voting equation, the total error variance is equal 
to l a2 = 0.0926 plus a2 = 0.0469. Thus, because of the substantialu v 
magnitude of 6, errors by the setter are estimated to have twice the 
effect of the random turnout component on voting behavior. In contrast, 
most of the variance of the first expenditure equation is ascribed to the 
econometrician's inability to capture the purely static feature of demand, 
since 2 '1 = 0.025 is nearly eight times the estimated setter error 
variance, 2 au = 0.0032. The "noise" in the static model may make it 
difficult to discuss the sequence effects. In any event, we estimate that 
setters do not make substantial errors15 (at the mean first election
proposal of $957.09, setter errors of +a = .0566 would result in -u 
proposals of $917 and $1000), a result in line with our basic premise that 
setters actively pursue a goal of budget-maximization. 
Another clue to these results may lie in the findings of Rubinfeld 
(1977), who used survey data on individuals to analyze voting in a 
Michigan school district. There were two elections to pass a budget. The 
first one lost, but the second proposal-identical to the first-passed, 
with increased voter turnout. The critical difference in the second 
election appears to have been greater participation by women with 
school-age children who tended to vote for the proposal. A plausible 
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interpretation is that the first election loss ·influenced the turnout on 
the second election, particularly by those who were particularly 
threatened by a possible shutdown of the schools. 
Carrying this over to our results suggests that setters are aware 
that turnout is likely to increase on later elections. (Indeed, Romer and 
Rosenthal ( 1982c) have shown, for a much larger sample, that turnout is 
systematically larger on the passing election than on the first election.) 
Moreover, setters may be expecting relatively higher turnout by groups 
favoring the proposal. And voters may even change positions on the 
proposal. Our sample contains observations where the absolute number of 
No votes falls even when turnout increases substantially, hinting that 
some voters who initally vote No may change their votes as the closing of 
the schools becomes a more imminent possibility. These factors counteract 
the considerations for cutting the proposal, but are still consistent with 
expecting a higher Yes vote on a later election even if the proposal is 
unchanged. The parameters 112 and 113 may be capturing this expectation.
At the same time, the setter's failure to correct his initial error may be 
working against the full realization of a Yes vote consistent with 112 or
113• If u1>o in districts with a first election loss, then this effect is
negative, particularly if s is close to zero. Conse quen tl y, second and 
third election outcomes (whose sample means are 5 1. BS and 5 0. 8 S ,  
respectively) may be  much closer than the Yes vote implied by  112
(approximately 56S) or 113 (60$).
Conclusion 
This research has largely confirmed the agenda setter model's ability 
to account for the static properties of cross-sectional spending and 
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voting in Oregon. Estimates of the demand parameters ( B), reversion 
parameters (6 and �). and perception parameter (p) are unaffected by 
sequence effects. The number of elections needed for passage and voting 
in a given election both appear largely determined by the interaction of 
2 2 the setter's error (au) and "random" effects on voting (a v). If we group
the districts by whether one, two, or more than two elections were 
required to pass, we find that group means of both the exogenous and 
endogenous variables vary little in comparison to the within-group 
standard deviations. Earlier research (Romer and Rosenthal, 19 82a) showed 
that the exogenous variables have no direct ability to explain the vote 
logits. The only systematic effect on voting is the setter's behavior. 
The parameter 6 is negative as predicted, and the estimate is 2. 7 times 
its standard error. 
We have not dealt successfully with the dynamics. The insignificant 
variation in the Bot and the insignificant value of s leave us with 
no
evidence for either a pre-planned decreasing sequence of proposals (Romer 
and Rosenthal, 1979a) or heuristic learning. 
Most work in the political economy of public finance, including ours, 
assumes constant indirect preferences for spending and either constant or 
random turnout. Our results make these assumptions less attractive. 
Finding the 11t consistent with the model even in the absence of
significant Bot or s suggests that turnout and preferences may vary
systematically in a dynamic context. 
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APPENDIX 
We rewrite the system (11)-(12) in matrix notation. We define .ft to 
equal ln !t (t:
1,2, 3) ,  and use! to summarize the exogenous variables. We
implicitly include the nonlinear parameters in .£ and !_: 
.ft = xst + .!.1t 
!t = ]_at + �t 
where 
£.11 = �1 + �1 
!.21 = 0�1 + !.1 
!.12 = (1-s)�1 -(s/0)_!1 + �1 + �2 
£.22 : 0(1-s)�1 - S!_1 + !_2 
2 
!.13 = (1-s) �1 - (s/olC
1-s)_!1 - (s/o)_!2 + �1 + �2 + �3 
2 !_23 = OC
1-s) �1 - s(1-sl!_1 - s� + !_3 
(A 1) 
(A2) 
We need to distinguish between the three sub-samples of school 
districts: the first set consisting of districts that held three 
elections, the second set consisting of districts where the second 
election passed and the third where the first election passed. We number 
school districts 1, ••• ,n3, . . .  ,n2+n3, . . . ,N. The first n3 school districts 
have three elections, the next n2 districts pass on the second election, 
while the last n1=N -n2-n3 school districts get their budgets approved in 
the first election. We assume there is no correlation across school 
districts. We wish to derive the probability of observing a given sample. 
Consider a school district j, where the expenditure is approved in 
the first election. The probability of this happening is Pr(Vjl �O ). The 
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joint probability of observing the given expenditure, the vote, and 
termination of the election process can be expressed as: 
f(ej11'&j21) Pr(Vj1 � O I &j11'&j21) = 
f(&j11' &j21) Pr(&j21�-a1 I &j11'&j21)' 
where f(ejll' ej21) is the joint density function of &jll' ej21• Notice 
that Pr(ej21 � -a1 I &jll' ej21) is either 0 or 1 and hence need not 
appear in the likelihood function. 
Therefore the probability of observing the sample of n1 school 
districts [suppressing the term Pr( & j21 � -a1 I & jl 1, & j21)] where the 
budget is passed on the first election is given by: 
N 
- n f( e. e ) J=n2+n3+1 
J11' j21 
(A3) 
Likewise, the joint probability of observing the sample of n2 school 
districts [suppressing the term Pr(ej22 > - a2 I &j11' £j21' &j12' &j22)] 
which pass on the second election is: 
n2+n3 ) n f(ej12'&j21' &j12'&j22 j:n3+1 
The joint probability of observing the other n3 districts is: 
n3 _n f(ej11 , ej12'ej21 ,ej22'ej13'ej23) J=1 
(All) 
(AS) 
30 
The probability of observing the entire sample is given by the product of 
(A3), (A4), and (AS): 
N n2+n3 
. n f (e:j11'e:j21). n fCe:j11'e:j21'e:j12'e:j22l x J=n2+n3+1 J=n3+1 
n3 
n 
j:1 f(e:j11'e:j21'e:j12'e:j22'e:j1
3'e:j23) 
Define 
uj2 = [e:j11' e:j21] j = n2+n3+1, • • •  , N
uj4 = [e:j11' e:j21' e:j12' e:j22] j = n3+1, • • •  , n2+n3 
uj6 = [e:j11' e:j21' e:j12' e:j22' e:j13' e:j231 j = 1, • • •  ,n3 
We assume that ujk is N(Q., Ik) k=2, 4, 6
where i:6 is a 6x6 covariance matrix with entries given by (13)- (33), and 
i:2 and i:4 are the appropriate 2x2 and 4x4 upper left-hand submatrices of
i:6. 
The joint density of the e:'s is 
-n1 -n112 N _1 , (211') 1i:21 exp{- (1/2). i: u j2 i:2 u j2l J=n2+n3+1 
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We wish to transform this to the density of the observed endogenous 
variables Et and Vt. For observation j the determinant of the Jacobian of
this transformation is 
Let 
CE1j - PA} _, 
[ (Elj - pAj) (E2 j  - pAj)] 
_, 
[ (Elj - pAj)CE2 j  -pAj)CE3j-pAj)] 
T 
W1 = I lnCE1 . - pA .) j:l J J 
n2+n3 
w2 = I ln(E2. - pAj) j:1 J 
n3 
w3 = _i: ln(E3j - pAj) J=1 
j = n2+n3+1, • • •  , N
j = n3+1, • • •  ,n2+n3 
_, j = 1, • • •  , n3 
Then the log-likelihood function is 
L = const. 
where 
-1 , - (1/2)[n1lnlI2 1 + n2 lnlt41 + n3lnlI61 + trCu2i:2 U2) _, , -1 , + trCu4i:4 u4 ) + trcu6 i:6 u6)J - w1 - w2 - w3 
-2n2 -n212 n2+n3 _1 , (211') 1i:41 exp{- (1/2)_ i: uj4 i:4 uj4l • u2 = [f.1 - xs1, y1 -1a1l J=n3+1 
n 
( -3n -n 12 
3 1 U = [C - XS V -
1 C X V ] 
211') 3 1I61 3 exp{- (1/2)l: u. i:-u":} 
4 -1 -1'-1 _a1·-2 ---!2·-2 -la2 
j:l J6 6 J6 
and u6 = [£1 - xs1, y1 -la1, � - �· � -1�· .£3 - XS3• !3 - �3] 
1. 
2. 
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FOOTNOTES 
See, e.g., Feld stein ( 197 5 )  and Slack ( 1980 ). John son ( 197 9 )  
recognizes the importance o f  treating governments as something 
different from "perfect preference aggregators , "  but does not 
explicitly model a political process. 
See, e.g., Megdal ( 1982 ) , who recognizes the importance of 
institutional structure. She takes great care in capturing the state 
aid formula in her regressions. She nonetheless asserts that "median 
voter" politics characterize her entire sample, which consists of New 
J ersey school districts with quite diverse institutions. 
3. See, e.g., Slack (1980).
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
See, e.g., Gramlich (1977 ), Whitman and Cline (1978), Johnson (1979).
In addition to the works cited in the text, agenda control in the
context of public expenditures has been explored by De nzau and Mackay
(1980) and Mackay and Weaver (1978).
The most frequently invoked (by economists) such model is the "median
voter" framework. Although usually not explicitly specified,
implicit in this model is the assumption of open or competitive
agendas, with no restrictions on access to the agenda.
These remar ks apply to the Oregon institutional structure prior to
197 9. The actual number of elections allowed wa s subject to change
by state legislation. The limit ha s never been more than eight
elections. For the period covered by the data we used in this paper,
the limit wa s six • 
Beck ( 1981) ackn owledges reversion effects in his model of Michigan
school spending. But even though there is substantial and complex
variation in reversions among Michigan sc hool districts, Beck assumes
zero reversions � school closings � for all districts in his
empirical work.
9. These findings are consistent wi th the oft-cited "flypaper effect" of
intergovernmental aid (see, e.g., Gramlich, 1977;  Whitman and Cline,
1978 ). The tendency for spending to increase by roughly the amoun t
of such aid is consonant with and reinforced by the setter's behavior.
10. Courant et al. (1979) and Oates (1979) have also offered arguments
for "flypaper" due to perception effects. For a brief critique of
these arguments, see Filimon et al. (1982).
11. In general, the voting effect of the setter's error will depend on
the entire distribution of voters' preferences. Consequently, 6 may 
vary from one district to another. Constraining 5 to be ·constant is
a strong assumption.
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12. Our use of medians in the empirical specification should not be taken
to mean that we regard a "median" voter as pivotal. The "multiple"
and "fractile" identification problems discu ssed in Romer and
Rosenthal (1979b) imply that one cannot conclude from a loglinear
model that a "med;i. an" voter is decisive (in the case of a median
voter model) or pivotal (in the case of a setter model). Moreover,
even if preferences are single-peaked and there is full turnout, we
cannot expect the voter with median demand to be at the median on
every independent variable, except under very restrictive conditions.
Consequently, we do not view the equation for the proposal of the
setter to be a vehicle for identifying whether a voter with specific
characteristics is decisive or pivotal.
13. For more details on the use of this approximation, see Filimon, �
.!.!..:. (1982).
14. We experimented with a modified version of the "learning update" b.y 
hypothesizing that adjustments occur only if .the first election loses
by more than a given percentage of votes; thus,
"L•ming Updato• 
• { :.(V 1_ 1 ) I ,
i f  v 1 � IJ 
if v1 < 
�
Here �<O is a prespecified parameter. We estimated the system on 
two-election data for several values of Ci,  corresponding to a range 
of first election vote outcomes from 30 S Yes to 49S Yes. The 
likelihood function was maximized for Ci corresponding to an
approximately 47 S Yes vote. The e stimated parameters were 
essentially identical to our original estimates. Allowing for a 
"zone of indifference" did not alter our finding that the update 
parameter s is not significantly different from zero. 
15. We computed lnCE1-pA)  .!.au at the sample means of E1, A and p:O. 975. $917 and $1000 correspond to the values of E1 implied by this
computation.
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